Abstract: Using a standard decomposition of forecasts errors into common and idiosyncratic shocks, we show that aggregate forecast uncertainty can be expressed as the disagreement among the forecasters plus the perceived variability of future aggregate shocks. Thus, the reliability of disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty will be determined by the stability of the forecasting environment, and the length of the forecast horizon. Using density forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, we find direct evidence in support of our hypothesis. Our results support the use of GARCH-type models, rather than the ex post squared errors in consensus forecasts, to estimate the ex ante variability of aggregate shocks as a component of aggregate uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
Forecast uncertainty is playing an increasingly important role in macroeconomics and monetary policy making. Since the mid-90s, the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank have been reporting fan charts that show subjective confidence bands surrounding official forecasts. Effective November 2007, each member of the U.S.
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is also publishing information about uncertainty associated with their economic outlooks. These advances in the quantification and communication strategies by central banks are expected to contribute to a more informed discussion and monitoring of future economic prospects than is possible with point forecasts alone, see Bernanke (2007) and Wallis (2004) .
Since forecast uncertainty is intrinsically unobservable, evaluating its estimates poses challenging methodological problems. As a result, economists have experimented with alternative proxies for forecast uncertainty. One of the more popular real time measures has been forecast disagreement, simply calculated as the dispersion in alternative point forecasts. When disagreement is taken to indicate uncertainty, the underlying assumption is that this inter-personal dispersion measure is an acceptable proxy for the average dispersion of intra-personal predictive probabilities held by individual experts. The validity of this assumption can by no means be taken for granted.
Since the seminal work of Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) , economists have studied but disagreed on whether disagreement is a good proxy for uncertainty. 1 As pointed out by Bomberger (1996) and Giordani and Söderlind (2003) , disagreement remains a theoretically unfounded measure of uncertainty. Interestingly, there has been parallel but largely independent research in the accounting and finance literature on whether disagreement among financial or market analysts can be used as a proxy for uncertainty about future earnings.
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In this paper, we establish a simple relationship connecting forecast uncertainty to disagreement. Using a standard decomposition of forecast errors into common and idiosyncratic components, we show that forecast uncertainty equals disagreement plus the variance of future aggregate shocks that accumulate over the horizons. This finding has important implications for the empirical studies that use disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty. It suggests that the robustness of the proxy depends on the variance of aggregate shocks over time and across horizons. It also simplifies the multi-dimensional covariance matrix of individual forecast errors in Barry and Jennings (1992) in terms of the variance of aggregate shocks, which can be easily interpreted as the uncertainty shared by all forecasters due to their exposure to future common shocks.
Using a panel of density forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters over
1969-2007, we find direct evidence in support of our hypothesized time and horizon effects. As for the time effect, disagreement is found to be a reliable measure for uncertainty in stable periods. In periods with large volatility of aggregate shocks, however, disagreement becomes a less reliable proxy. As for the horizon effect, we find that the longer the forecast horizon, the larger is the difference between disagreement and uncertainty.
In recent accounting and finance literature, squared errors in consensus forecasts have been used as proxies for the variance of future aggregate shocks as a component of forecast uncertainty. Our results suggest that adding the squared mean forecast error to disagreement can make the estimated uncertainty worse than using disagreement alone.
If one wants to construct a robust ex ante measure of uncertainty, our suggestion is to use the sum of the observed disagreements from the survey and the variance of future aggregate shocks generated by GARCH-type models that use a moving average squared errors over past few years as one of the covariates.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop the theoretical model and derive the relationship between disagreement and uncertainty.
Section 3 tests empirically whether disagreement is a reliable proxy for uncertainty and suggests a method to construct the ex ante measure of uncertainty. Section 4 concludes.
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
This section begins with deriving the unconditional relationship between forecast uncertainty and disagreement. In this context, we then connect our framework to the Bayesian learning model. The conditional relationship between forecast uncertainty and disagreement that is relevant in real time is presented at the end of this section.
The unconditional relationship between uncertainty and disagreement
For N individuals, T target years, H forecast horizons, let ith F be the forecast of 
Following Lahiri (1995, 1999) , we write ith e as the sum of a component common to all forecasters ( th λ ) and idiosyncratic errors ( ith ε ): The common component ( th λ ) represents the cumulative effect of all shocks that occurred from h-quarter ahead to the end of target year t. Equation (3) shows that this accumulation of shocks is the sum of each quarterly shock ( tj u ) that occurred over the span. Even if forecasters make "perfect" forecasts, the forecast error may still be nonzero due to shocks which are, by nature, unpredictable. Forecasters, however, do not make "perfect" forecasts even in the absence of unanticipated shocks. This "lack of perfectness" is due to other factors (e.g., differences in information acquisition and processing, interpretation, judgment, and forecasting models) specific to a given individual at a given point in time and is represented by the idiosyncratic error ( ith ε ).
We make the following simplifying assumptions:
Assumption 1: Thus, aggregate shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated over time and horizons (assumption 1). The idiosyncratic errors are taken to be mutually uncorrelated at all leads and lags (assumption 2). In addition, the common component and idiosyncratic disturbances are assumed to be uncorrelated at all leads and lags (assumption 3), which is a standard assumption in the literature. Taken together, assumptions 1 to 3 imply that the individual forecast error is a zero-mean stationary process for any h and has the factor model interpretation.
The observed disagreement ( th d ) among forecasters is the variance of their point forecasts which, given (1) and (2), can be expressed as: Thus, not surprisingly, we find that th D is determined by the average variance of idiosyncratic errors.
The uncertainty associated with a forecast of any specific individual is measured by the variance of the individual forecast error, and can be expressed as 3 The number of forecasters in the survey changes over both t and h. For simplicity, we suppress the subscripts t and h of N in equation (4) After substituting (5) into (7) 
Given the model assumptions, forecast uncertainty, disagreement and the variance of forthcoming aggregate shocks are expected to be related in the sample as in (8) − uncertainty is simply the disagreement plus the variance of the accumulated aggregate shocks over the forecast horizon. Thus, the wedge between uncertainty and disagreement will be determined partly by the size of the forecast horizon over which the aggregate shocks accumulate -the longer is the forecast horizon the bigger will be the difference on average. It also suggests that the robustness of the relationship between the two will depend on the variability of aggregate shocks over time. In relatively stable time periods where the perceived variability of the aggregate shocks is small, whether the perceptions are correct or not, disagreement will be a good proxy for the unobservable aggregate uncertainty. In periods where the perceived volatility of the aggregate shocks is high, disagreement can become a tenuous proxy for uncertainty.
Connection to Bayesian learning model
In our current framework, we model the variance of forecast errors without modeling forecasters' expectation formation process. Actually, it is easy to connect our model with Bayesian learning framework that explicitly models individuals' forecasting behavior. Suppose that each forecaster is endowed with two signals: one public signal, represented by
and one private signal, represented by
The private signal is assumed to be independent of the public signal and also independent of other private signals, which are standard assumptions in the literature; see Lahiri and Sheng (2008a Note that overall forecast uncertainty in (13), derived in the context of a Bayesian learning framework, provides the justification that the aggregate uncertainty can be defined as the simple average of individual uncertainties as in (7). It is the combined uncertainty with equal weights in the context of the forecast combination literature.
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The disagreement among forecasters can be measured by the expected dispersion 
After substituting for ith F from (11), we get 
Note that the first term on the right-hand side of (15) is forecast uncertainty, th U and the second term is the average covariance among forecast errors, th C , where 
which can be easily interpreted as the uncertainty shared by all forecasters due to their exposure to common shocks. Thus, (17) greatly simplifies the results in Barry and Jennings (1992) and Barron et al. (1998) , and gives the relationship (8).
Relationship between uncertainty and disagreement in real time
Note that equation (8) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (19) can alternatively be written as (see Markowitz 1959, p.111) :
Given our framework, (20) can be expressed as
We should point out that the uncertainty about the consensus forecast in (21) defined by Bomberger (1996) is different from our measure of forecast uncertainty in (7). The uncertainty about the consensus forecast is less than the average of the individual uncertainties due to the fact that combining individual forecasts implicitly pools the 7 In the context of forecast combination, Batchelor and Dua (1995) had a similar decomposition.
diverse idiosyncratic errors. Note that, as the number of forecasters goes to infinity, the uncertainty about the consensus forecast will reflect only the uncertainty in the common information.
Substituting (21) in (19), we obtain (22) will be very close to zero and can be ignored. 8 Thus, the difference between the reported ex ante forecast uncertainty and disagreement will give approximate estimates of ex ante variances of aggregate shocks in real time before the actual values were realized.
In the context of equations (21) and (22), one can understand the efforts of Bomberger (1996) who examined the dependence of uncertainty associated with the average forecast (he called "consensus uncertainty") on forecast disagreement. Certainly, a positive relationship between the two during periods of economic instability will ensure that disagreement will continue to be positively correlated with the overall forecast uncertainty. However, since the difference between uncertainty and disagreement is the variance of unanticipated aggregate shocks, theoretically it is not clear why disagreement will be able to predict the latter. Our model assumptions, though admittedly simple, rule out any feedback from perceived future variability of common shocks to current idiosyncratic individual variances. However, it is possible that greater uncertainty about σ . This is how Bomberger's (1996) econometric exercise can be justified.
On the other hand, as Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) have pointed out, there may be periods where all forecasters agree on relatively high macroeconomic uncertainty in the immediate future, and hence disagreement between forecasters will be low even though uncertainty is high. The opposite is also possible where forecasters disagree a lot about their mean forecasts, but they are confident about their individual predictions. This situation will arise when forecasters disagree on otherwise precise models and scenarios that should be used to depict the movement of the economy over the forecasting horizon.
Thus, lacking any theoretical basis, the strength and the stability of the relationship between disagreement and overall forecast uncertainty becomes an empirical issue. But our result clearly suggests that the relationship will depend crucially on the sample period, the target variable, and length of the forecast horizon. Our analysis also helps to reconcile the divergent findings in previous empirical studies examining the appropriateness of disagreement as a proxy for forecast uncertainty. Certainly, contrary to a statement in Bomberger (1996, p.385) , it is not necessary that "if disagreement is to be a good proxy for individual uncertainty, it must also track consensus uncertainty".
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY AND DISAGREEMENT
This section begins with a short description of data on density forecasts used in this study. In subsequent sections, we present empirical evidence in support of our hypothesized relationship between disagreement and uncertainty over time and horizons.
We then evaluate the appropriateness of using squared error of mean forecasts as a proxy for the variance of aggregate shocks that has been extensively used in recent accounting literature. Our suggestion to construct a robust measure of ex ante uncertainty, given a panel of forecasts, is presented at the end.
Data
The data in our study are taken from Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) that is provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. A unique feature of SPF data is that forecasters are also asked to provide density forecasts for output growth and inflation, which is the focus of this paper. The historical time series of forecasts in this survey is quite lengthy (since the fourth quarter of 1968), and there are a number of changes in the surveys that make the data challenging to work with. We focus on the density forecasts for the change from year 1 − t to t that were issued in the four consecutive surveys from the first quarter through the fourth quarter of year t. To test the hypothesized relationships, we also need the actual values of inflation and output growth. As is well known, the NIPA data often go through serious revisions.
Obviously, the most recent revision is not a good choice, since it involves adjustment of definitions and classifications. Consistent with the findings in Harvey and Newbold (2003) that the unrevised data approximates the forecasters' objective better, we choose the first release of annual inflation and output growth to compute the actual values. These are the real-time data available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
Estimates of uncertainty and disagreement
Note that the variance of forecast error in (6) can be interpreted as the variance of random variable t A as perceived by individual i, given information available at time h t − , which is conceptually the same as the variance of the density forecast reported by individual i. Taking the average of the variances of individual densities yields estimates of forecast uncertainty as defined in (7).
To get appropriate measures of forecast disagreement, we need to control for possible individual biases in the sample. These biases may arise due to different loss functions held by forecasters and other behavioral factors that are expected to be relatively stable over time. Following Lahiri (1995, 1999) , the individual forecast error has a 3-dimensional nested structure in the presence of individual bias ih φ : 
10 See Giordani and Söderlind (2003) and Lahiri and Liu (2005) for a detailed discussion on the specification and construction of the analytical sample, and hence not repeated here. 11 All calculations reported in this paper were also repeated with the so called "first final" (i.e., the third monthly revision) and July revisions. The main results and conclusions were unchanged.
The systematic individual bias, ih φˆ, can be estimated as
After adjusting for these individual biases, we get forecast disagreement based on unbiased forecasts.
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Estimates of uncertainty, disagreement and their difference, which is an estimate of the variance of ex ante aggregate shock, are plotted in Figures 1 to 4 . Their average values are given in Table 1 . Several points are worth noting. Disagreement and uncertainty typically move together but the former is almost always smaller than the latter in both series, which is in line with the evidence that the former tends to underestimate the latter (cf. Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Lahiri et al. 1988) .
Uncertainty is seen to be very sticky in terms of its high autocorrelation and low volatility and as a result, responds slowly to even rapid changes in the economic environment.
13 Also, the difference between uncertainty and disagreement (i.e., the variance of ex ante aggregate shocks) in both series becomes larger, as forecast horizon gets longer from 1 quarter to 4 quarters, which provides evidence in support of the horizon effect. Note also that the estimated variances of aggregate shocks are systematically much bigger for GDP growth than inflation at all horizons. This finding implies that it is more difficult to forecast real GDP growth than inflation, and is consistent with most studies on forecast σ is the sample variance of individual bias across forecasters. Individual biases were, however, estimated to be relatively small, and thus they did not affect forecast disagreement by any significant amount. 13 This is also true for time series measures of uncertainty. Giordani and Söderlind (2003) and Lahiri and Liu (2005) show that the GARCH measure of uncertainty fails to capture the increase in inflation uncertainty around the second oil price shock.
evaluation that report significantly higher RMSE for real GDP than for inflation forecasts. It is well known that the distribution and variance of point forecasts can be particularly volatile due to the presence of few outliers in the sample. Indeed, if we use more robust measures of disagreement such as the quasi-standard deviation or inter-quartile range, this apparent anomaly mostly disappears, see Giordani and Söderlind (2003, Figure 5 ).
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14 See, for instance, Öller and Barot (2000) , Banerjee and Marcellino (2006) , Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) , and Lahiri and Sheng (2008b) . 15 Quasi standard deviation is the half distance between the 84 th and 16 th percentiles of the distribution of point forecasts. Under normality, it will be identical to the usual standard deviation.
There are other possibilities that should also be pointed out. It could be that survey measure of uncertainty does not represent the "true" or objective uncertainty correctly. Diebold et al. (1999) concluded that survey uncertainty overestimates the true values.
However, Giordani and Söderlind (2003) reached an opposite conclusion. Following the latter approach, in Table 2 we report the average percentage times the 90% predictive interval covers the actual outcomes after fitting a uniform distribution over the bins during 1969-2007. We find that survey measures of uncertainty are well calibrated for all horizons except 4-quarter ahead forecasts, for which the survey measure underestimates the objective uncertainty by 13% for inflation and 17% for output growth forecasts. This possible underestimation of the true uncertainty by survey densities can rule out a few of the negative estimates of the variance of aggregate shocks.
16 Also, if we believe that, for a particular horizon, the extent of under or over-estimation is time invariant, the survey uncertainty will continue to be a meaningful indicator for true forecast uncertainty. Even if adjusted upwards by 13%, the inflation uncertainty is still far less than disagreement for the 4-quarter ahead forecast for 1980.
Another explanation can be the well-documented structural break of the early 80s.
As is well known, inflation rose sharply and unexpectedly during 1979-1981, and is characterized by a break in the inflation process. This may lead to forecasters adopting disparate forecasting functions and as a result, their predictions may generate extraordinary disagreement. As Mankiw et al. (2003) have argued, the distribution of point forecasts may become multi-modal as forecasters learn about the new regime and 16 Following Giordani and Söderlind (2003) , we also fitted normal distributions over histograms and repeated the same comparison exercise. As expected, the normal approximation suggested even more underestimation. Many recent studies have, however, avoided the practice of fitting normal distribution to the individual density forecasts because the majority of the respondents seldom assign probabilities to more than 3 intervals, see Engelberg et al. (2006 (5) and (16) reveal, for the validity of relation (8) or (22), we need the average pair-wise covariances in forecast errors (net of common shocks) to be zero. Using the 4-quarter ahead inflation forecasts, we however, found that this condition was not violated even during the tumultuous period 1979-83. 17 Thus, on balance, we feel that the estimated negative variance of aggregate shocks on few occasions in our sample can be attributed to the imprecision in the estimation of disagreement or uncertainty due to small samples and outliers.
We now formally test the implications of (22) Bomberger (1996) and Giordani and Söderlind (2003) . As is also clear in Table 3 , the difference between uncertainty and disagreement, which is an estimate of ex ante variance of aggregate shocks, is larger, as forecast horizon gets longer. For example, as the horizon increases from 1 quarter to 4 quarters, the difference increases monotonically from 0.24 to 0.96 in output growth
forecasts. This pattern is also observed for inflation forecasts during the stable period at all horizons with the exception of 4-quarter ahead forecasts, which means that the additional variability due to the shocks that fell during the first quarter of the current year (on the average during 1984-2007) compared to the remaining quarters is not significant. This is caused by the relatively high disagreement in 4-quarter ahead forecasts during the 1986-1989 period compared to other forecasts (see Figure 1) . Furthermore, all horizon dummies are estimated to be statistically significant at the 5% level. On balance, the empirical evidence above shows that the variance of aggregate shocks accumulates systematically over horizons, as predicted by our model. This finding is important since most of studies have focused on their relationship over time, without specifying the underlying forecast horizons. An influential paper in the accounting literature by Barron et al. (1998) extended the model in Barry and Jennings (1992) and suggested "one can infer uncertainty and consensus from observable forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast and the number of forecasts" (Barron et al. 1998, p. 427) . Their suggestion has been extensively used to study the information environment in analysts' earning forecasts. Yet, without direct information on uncertainty, the validity of their suggestion in finite samples can never be established. Our analysis below addresses this issue. Barron et al. (1998) argued that one could use the squared error in the mean forecast as a proxy for the variance of aggregate shock to empirically estimate forecast uncertainty as in the following equation
Comparing the above equation to (18), it immediately follows that the measure of uncertainty in (26) is nothing but the average squared individual forecast errors.
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Because forecast errors are known to respondents only after the announcement of actual values, (26) indeed yields a measure of ex post uncertainty. Its reliability as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty faced by individual forecasters at the time of forecast is questionable.
With density forecasts at our disposal, we can compare them directly.
18 Two exceptions are the recent papers by Patton and Timmermann (2008) , and Lahiri and Sheng (2008a) , who explicitly modeled the term structure of survey forecasts over horizons. 19 During our sample period, the squared error of the mean forecast accounts for 40% to 70% of ex post uncertainty in output growth forecast and from 30% to 60% in inflation forecast, as the horizon gets longer from 1-to 4-quarter ahead. The remainder is attributable to disagreement. (26) is considerably more volatile. In particular, the ex post uncertainty overstates the survey measure of uncertainty whenever a forecast is followed by a large unanticipated forecast error. This is unfortunate because, being unanticipated, these errors should not have affected the forecast uncertainty that predates the observed forecast error. The regression results in Table 4 reinforce some of the features from these graphs. For inflation forecasts, the estimated coefficient on ex post uncertainty is almost zero during the unstable period [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] . Even in the stable period, the coefficients are estimated to be very small for both inflation and output growth forecasts. Comparing 2 R in Tables 3 and 4 , we see that disagreement alone is a reasonable proxy for uncertainty. However, adding the squared error in the consensus forecast to disagreement turns out to be a significantly worse proxy for uncertainty than the disagreement alone. Clearly, forecast uncertainty constructed according to Barron et al. (1998) depends on the realization of individual forecast errors. But forecast error is necessarily an ex post quantity, which reflects unexpected shocks after the forecast is made, and thus should not affect uncertainty at the time a forecast is issued. One may think that it may be an acceptable practice to use mean squared forecast error as a proxy for its ex ante counterpart because Barron et al. (1998) with the empirical evidence presented in Engle (1983) , strongly caution against using the squared error in the mean forecast as a component of overall forecast uncertainty. We show below that forecast disagreement by itself, without adding the ex post mean squared error, correlates better with the observed survey uncertainty.
Ex ante measures of uncertainty using GARCH
Because uncertainty is essentially an ex ante concept attached to a forecast before the actual outcome is known, it must be constructed using data available in real time. The celebrated ARCH model (Engle, 1982) and its various extensions are now standard methods for modeling forecast uncertainty based on aggregate data. This literature posits that forecast uncertainty of a variable can be measured by the conditional variance of its forecast error that, in turn, is assumed to depend on past forecast error and lagged forecast uncertainty.
In order to generate GARCH-type estimates of the variability of aggregate shocks, we first filter the mean forecast errors for possible autocorrelation; see Harvey and Newbold (2003) . The order of autocorrelation present in a given mean forecast error series is found by fitting moving average models of varying order, the preferred model being chosen by the use of Schwarz information criterion. We then estimated 
where t e is the serially uncorrelated mean forecast error. Equation (27) has been estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood procedure (cf. Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 1992) for the 1984-2007 subsample and for each horizon. Consistent with many earlier studies, in Model 2 we estimated (27) using the t-distribution with 6 degrees of freedom.
As an alternative specification, 21 we replaced the lagged mean squared forecast error in (27) with the average of mean squared errors over the last ten years. 
21 This follows Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) who suggested a measure of past forecast uncertainty using squared individual forecast errors of a number of private and government forecasters averaged over 1986-2006. Their purpose is to use this average historical uncertainty based on past predictive accuracy as a benchmark against which FOMC participants can assess their present uncertainty. 22 During 1974-1981, SPF did not ask for the annual average forecast. We matched the reported quarterly point forecasts with the real time data to derive the implied annual forecasts for the current year.
Model 4 estimated (28) using the t-distribution with 6 degrees of freedom. Models 5 through 8 correspond to Models 1 through 4, except that we modeled the standard deviation instead of the variance in the GARCH-type models. The estimation results, not reported here, show that the lagged variance of aggregate shocks was significant at the 5% level in the majority of the cases, but the lagged mean forecast errors, as well as the average of mean squared errors over the last ten years, are only significant in some cases, depending on the horizons and variables under study.
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To form a measure of forecast uncertainty, our suggestion is to use the observed disagreement from the survey, th d and the variance of aggregate shocks generated conditionally by GARCH-type models, idiosyncratic information and diversity in forecasting models. The measure of uncertainty in (29) avoids the drawback of the inability to capture the heterogeneity of forecasting models in using GARCH measure of uncertainty alone. Our suggestion is supported by the findings in Batchelor and Dua (1993) and Bomberger (1996) ; in a comparison of ARCH and survey measures of uncertainty, these two studies concluded that the former tends to be lower than the latter, and more importantly the former is less variable over time than the latter. Thus, if one accepts survey measures as valid, ARCH measure alone underestimates the level and the variation in uncertainty over time.
According to (29), forecast uncertainty is generated by the sum of the estimated variance of aggregate shocks from GARCH-type models and the disagreement from the survey. Table 5 shows the correlations between survey and generated measures of uncertainty. Several points stand out. First, the GARCH estimates of uncertainty with the average squared errors over the last ten years (in place of the last period forecast error)
help to capture the variation in the survey measure of uncertainty fairly well (Models 3, 4, 7 and 8). Compared to the simple correlation with the disagreement alone (the first row in Table 5 ), the correlations between the survey uncertainty and the uncertainty generated by Models 3, 4, 7 and 8 increase by about 5% for 1-and 2-quarter ahead inflation forecasts, and by more than 15% and 10% for 3-and 4-quarter ahead GDP forecasts, respectively. This is because the relative importance of aggregate shocks is more for GDP growth than inflation forecasts, and hence it pays to project them using GARCH. Second, models with t-distributions (Models 2, 4, 6 and 8) match survey measure of uncertainty better. In general, Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 using t-distribution with 6 degree of freedom perform better to capture the variation in survey uncertainty than Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 using normal distribution. Third, modeling the standard deviation instead of the variance tends to do a better job in representing the variation in survey measure of uncertainty. For output growth forecasts, the best model seems to be Model 8 that performs even better at longer horizons. For inflation forecasts, the best model is Model 8 at shorter horizons and Model 6 at longer horizons. In addition, when we add squared mean forecast errors to disagreement (Model 0), its predictive power to proxy survey uncertainty decreases across almost all horizons for both variables, echoing a point that we have established in section 3.3.
In summary, compared to squared forecast errors, the GARCH-type models are relatively more successful in modeling the variability of future aggregate shocks to the economy in the sense that when added to disagreement, this composite measure of ex ante forecast uncertainty explains the corresponding survey measure better than disagreement alone. However, the additional explanatory power due to the addition of GARCH estimates is sometimes modest.
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We plot the evolution of uncertainty generated from the best models in inflation and output growth forecasts over time in Figures 5 and 6 . Compared to the uncertainty constructed using the squared error in the mean forecast, the uncertainty from GARCHtype models is less volatile and thus matches better the survey measure of uncertainty.
This underscores the important point that ex ante uncertainty has to be generated conditionally based on the information known to survey respondents when making their forecasts, which is exactly what GARCH-type models do. We should, however, note that the error-based measures of uncertainty including the GARCH have failed to signal the slowly creeping uncertainty in inflation and output growth forecasts since 2002 as indicated by the density forecasts. This is because the corresponding forecast errors have continued to be small despite the slow but steady increase in uncertainty due to unusual financial market developments and political instability in recent years. Uncertainty estimates based on density forecasts have an obvious advantage in this regard.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Due to the ready availability of point forecasts, disagreement among forecasters has been widely used as a proxy for aggregate uncertainty in the economics, accounting and finance literature. Lacking a theoretical basis, empirical evidence has been mixed as to whether the disagreement is a reliable measure for the uncertainty. Using a standard decomposition of forecast errors into common and idiosyncratic shocks in a panel data setting, our paper demonstrates that under certain regularity conditions, the difference between uncertainty and disagreement is the perceived variance of future aggregate shocks that accumulate over forecast horizons. This result has important implications. It implies that the robustness of the relationship between uncertainty and disagreement depends on the variance of aggregate shocks over time and across horizons. Using the SPF density forecasts for inflation and output growth, we find direct evidence in support of our hypothesized time and horizon effects. As for the time effect, disagreement is found to be a reliable measure for uncertainty in a stable period. In periods with large volatility of aggregate shocks, however, disagreement becomes less useful a proxy. As for the horizon effect, we find that the longer the forecast horizon, the larger is the difference between disagreement and uncertainty. Though disagreement alone tends to understate the level of uncertainty, our empirical results suggest that one can safely use disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty in a regression context, provided the forecast environment is relatively stable. By subtracting observed disagreement from uncertainty using density forecasts, we obtain a truly ex ante measure of aggregate shocks that befell on the economy. These aggregate shocks are available to a policy maker before the actual values are realized, and show remarkable reduction in the volatility after 1991.
Our results do not support the use of squared mean forecast errors to construct ex ante uncertainty, as often practiced in recent accounting and finance research. Since forecast error is an ex post measure reflecting unexpected shocks after the forecast is made, it should not affect uncertainty at the time of forecast. In order to construct an ex ante measure of forecast uncertainty, one should use the sum of the observed disagreement from the survey and the projected variance of aggregate shocks generated by a suitably specified GARCH-type model. We find that this approach performs much better than the use of squared forecast errors in matching the survey measure of uncertainty, and is less sensitive to occasional large forecast surprises. However, we should point out that still there remains some discrepancy between the survey measure and error-based ex ante measures of uncertainty that include the GARCH estimates.
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